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Abstract 
 
We investigate an experimental labor market setting in which we introduce the novel aspect that 
workers have the chance of investing money in a long-term project in order to increase their 
income. We find a strong relationship between what happens inside the labor market (worker’s 
performance) and what happens outside the labor market (long-term investment).  Contrary to 
the theoretical predictions with selfish preferences, we find that the mere presence of long-term 
projects acts as an effort-enforcement device; this effect seems to be driven by an increase in 
long-term employment relationships. In the other direction, long-term labor relationships seem to 
provide a safer environment for undertaking successful long-term projects. This article also 
considers three different types of experimental labor contracts. We find that performance-based 
dismissal barriers, whereby firms are required to retain workers if they have satisfied the effort 
level required by firms, lead to more long-term employment relationships and higher overall 
productivity. As theory predicts, the presence of renewable dismissal barriers makes it likely that 
workers will provide the desired effort level.  Firms appear to correctly anticipate this, leading to 
greater social efficiency.  
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1. Introduction 
There is an inter-relationship between many situations inside the labor market and 
decisions made outside the labor market. For instance, McDonald (2000), Adsera (2004), De la 
Rica and Iza (2005), Blossfeld et al. (2005) and Hondroyiannis (2010) show how the economic 
uncertainty inside the labor market has a significant negative impact on fertility decisions. They 
argue that many parents decide to have children when they are expect to be able to financially 
support a family, not only in the current economic situation but also in the future. Haurin and 
Gill (1987), Haurin (1991), Robst et al. (1999) and Diaz-Serrano (2005) also find an unequivocal 
negative effect of labor-income uncertainty on the propensity to own one’s own home. The 
economic intuition behind this evidence is that individuals take into account both their present 
and their projected future job situation when making decisions outside the labor market (such as 
buying a house or having children). 
As a consequence, attaining a strong degree of stability in employment has been one of 
the historical main aspirations of the working population. Indeed, one of the main goals of trade 
unions is to achieve some kind of employment protection legislation (EPL) that introduces 
dismissal barriers in the labor market.1 However, current dismissal barriers are mostly non-
performance-based. This may lead to a lack of incentives for high productivity; a familiar 
example is the behavior of some academics after receiving tenure.  In fact, even if a worker has 
the intrinsic motivation to work hard, this may be undermined by peer pressure, as other workers 
may be unhappy with workers who provide too much effort without incentives.  This leads to the 
question of whether it could be useful to relate dismissal barriers to performance. 
In this sense, the main contribution of this paper is our experimental analysis of how 
labor market uncertainty affects decisions outside the labor market and vice versa (i.e., how 
decisions outside the labor market influence behavior in the labor market). We investigate this in 
a labor-market experiment in which we incorporate the opportunity for workers to invest in long-
term projects. We also wish to study the importance of relating dismissal barriers to worker 
performance; we hypothesize that performance-based dismissal barriers could satisfy workers’ 
demand of stability while maintaining a high effort level from those workers once they have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Dismissal barriers arise, for example, in the presence of employment protection legislation (EPL), where hiring a 
worker beyond approbation period triggers barriers to dismissal, or in the case of relationship-specific investments 
that accrue over time and raise firing costs (see Mincer, 1962). 
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attained a permanent position. Our work would be applicable both to many European labor 
markets and to public-sector employment in most developed countries. 
Our baseline experimental framework is similar to that of Brown, Falk, and Fehr (2004), 
in which firms and workers in a labor-market setting can endogenously form long-term 
relationships. Firms offer contracts involving a wage and a desired effort level, and workers, 
after accepting a contract, choose any feasible effort irrespective of the level contractually agreed 
upon. With the aim of investigating the inter-relationship between decisions inside and outside 
the labor market, we introduce an additional stage (outside the labor market) labeled the 
investment stage. For simplicity, in this stage workers decide only whether or not to undertake a 
long-term project. If a worker chooses to do so in a given period, he must pay a fixed periodical 
amount from then on.2 This project will end only when he no longer pays this fixed amount 
(perhaps because he becomes unemployed or his salary in a period is insufficient). To capture the 
importance of the job stability on the subjects’ decisions of undertaking long-term projects, we 
make the profitability of the project depend crucially on the job situation. Only if a worker is 
employed for at least eight consecutive periods does the project yield positive profits.  
To analyze how the features of the labor market affect the investment decisions, we 
consider three different treatments.  In the baseline treatment, there is no dismissal barrier. Firms 
can always end a labor relationship after any period. In the permanent treatment, adapted from 
Falk, Huffman and MacLeod (2015), there is a dismissal institution present in the market, such 
that only the worker can end a relationship once the firm chooses to hire the worker in two 
consecutive periods. In addition, once workers are protected against dismissal, firms cannot 
reduce their wages.3 Falk, Huffman and MacLeod (2015) instantiate non-performance-based 
dismissal barriers of real-world labor markets and find that these barriers reduce efficiency. To 
study how labor-market outcomes are affected by basing dismissal barriers on performance, we 
introduce a novel treatment (labeled renewable contract) in which dismissal barriers are fully 
performance-based: worker’s performance is rewarded with the automatic renewal of his 
contract, contingent upon satisfactory performance.4 A worker must be re-hired if he provides an 
effort level at least as high as that demanded by the firm. In this case, the worker earns the right 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For expositional purposes, we assume throughout the paper that firms are female and workers are male. 
3This feature is implemented to rule out de facto dismissal by reducing wages to zero. 
4Previous experimental literature has found that rewarding performance is an effective incentive device to increase 
efficiency (see, among others, Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger, 1997, and Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt, 2007). 
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to get an offer in the next period from the same firm with at least the same wage.5 We 
acknowledge that this treatment might not map well to a world in which effort is non-
contractible, but it allows us to observe labor performance in the best scenario in which tenure is 
permitted. Additionally, by comparing markets with non-performance-based dismissal barriers 
and with fully-performance-based dismissal barriers, we can examine the market consequences 
of connecting performance to dismissal barriers.  
Before summarizing the experimental results, we develop some theoretical predictions 
with selfish preferences (standard theory). First, there should be no differences in the effort 
levels provided by workers between the Investment treatments and the No-investment 
treatments. Second, workers should not invest in any treatment where long-term projects are 
available. Finally, linking performance to dismissal barriers should lead workers to provide 
higher effort levels, increase the number of private offers and give rise to more long-term 
relationships. We also discuss some informal behavioral predictions based on the assumption in 
Brown, Fehr and Falk (2004) that firms believe there is a sufficient proportion of “fair” workers 
who will provide a non-minimal effort whenever firms offer wages above the equilibrium wage. 
First, we expect a larger frequency of non-minimal effort levels and long-term relationships in 
the contracts when investment is feasible than when it is not.  And to the extent that firms are 
sympathetic to worker investment, we would expect them to provide more wage/effort request 
combinations that would yield a sufficient amount of units to allow workers to invest. We also 
expect that there will be higher wages, higher effort, and more compliance with requested effort 
in the renewal contracts compared to the other two treatments (same prediction as the standard 
theory).   
  When we examine the inter-relationship between decisions made outside and inside the 
labor market with respect to the presence and form of dismissal barriers, one important result 
emerges: Those workers engaged in a long-term project provided higher effort levels. In order to 
check the robustness of this result, we replicated the three treatments removing the investment 
stage.  This leads to a first key result: The mere presence of long-term projects acts as an effort-
boosting device. Contrary to the theoretical predictions with selfish preferences, but in line with 
the behavioral predictions, workers provided higher effort levels when they had the option of 
investing in a long-term project. That is, when workers had this option, they perceived additional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5Examples for automatically renewable contracts can be found in sports; in many cases contracts are automatically 
renewed if the sportsman plays a previously fixed number of matches. 
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incentives to enhance their performance. Also contrary to the behavioral predictions, it is 
particularly interesting that having an investment possibility improves performance more in the 
treatments with either no dismissal barriers or permanent dismissal barriers than in the treatment 
with renewable dismissal barriers, where efficiency is already rather high. Being able to make 
long-term investment may orient workers more towards the future, with a larger effect when 
selfish and myopic behavior had prevailed.  In some sense, it could be that feeling that one can 
participate in the financial system makes one feel more like a stakeholder in the society, leading 
to higher performance in the workplace.  
Regarding the effect of contractual conditions on investment decisions, we observe that 
dismissal barriers appear to act as a reference point for workers, in the sense that most seem to 
wait to be protected against dismissal before investing.   
As standard theory predicts, we also find that linking dismissal barriers to performance 
leads to more efficient outcomes.  The distance between the desired and the actual effort was 
significantly smaller in the renewable than in the baseline treatment. This leads to a larger 
number of long relationships in this treatment. Overall, we find that the presence of performance-
based dismissal barriers increase firms’ profits and does not decrease workers’ earnings. These 
results hold with or without the possibility of investment. 
In summary, we find that the possibility of undertaking long-term projects outside the 
labor market positively affects workers’ performance inside the labor market.  In addition, we 
find that the presence of dismissal barriers inside the labor market provide a safer institutional 
setting for undertaking long-term projects more successfully outside of the labor market; with 
non performance-based dismissal barriers, firms are reluctant to get involved in long-term 
relationships since they are not protected against shirking.  Finally, if we include investment 
profits in the aggregate earnings for workers, our results show that relating dismissal barriers to 
performance yields a Pareto improvement for firms and workers. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the experimental design 
and procedures in Section 2. We discuss some behavioral predictions in Section 3. The main 
results are reported in Section 4 and we conclude in Section 5. 
 
 
2. Experimental design 
We know of only a few experimental studies on repeated interactions in the labor market; 
none of these considers conditional dismissal barriers or how the presence of dismissal barriers 
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affects the decision of undertaking long-term projects. We adapt the designs from Brown, Falk, 
and Fehr (2004) and Falk, Huffman and MacLeod (2015) for our treatments without dismissal 
barriers and with permanent dismissal barriers, respectively, and introduce our new contractual 
environment with renewable dismissal barriers.6 
Our experiment was conducted at the University of Granada with 323 participants, who 
were recruited via posters in the Faculty of Economics. All sessions were run in the lab, using z-
Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). No one was allowed to participate in more than one session. 
At the end of the instructions (see Appendix A), all subjects had to complete a questionnaire in 
order to facilitate comprehension. There were 18 periods in each session of each treatment.  On 
average, each person received about 20€ for a 90-minute session. 
We have three different types of labor contract: No Barrier, Permanent Barrier, and 
Renewable Barrier. A principal feature of our design is the possibility of making an external 
investment. As we mentioned earlier, labor-market uncertainties influence decisions regarding 
buying a house (close to our design) or having children. This stage is an attempt to analyze how 
the type of labor market institution may affect those important decisions out of the labor market. 
In order to check robustness and obtain clear conclusions about the relationship between 
decisions in the labor market and in the long-term investment projects, we also conducted a 
treatment for each type of labor contract without the possibility of investment.  Thus, we have six 
treatments in all.  
 
No-barrier treatment (NT1): This treatment is adapted from Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004). 
There were three phases in each individual period. In the first phase firms had the opportunity to 
submit private and public offers. Public offers stipulated a wage, a desired effort and the firm’s 
identification number (ID). All workers and firms could see public offers. For private offers, 
firms had to additionally provide a worker’s ID number. Only the worker to whom the ID 
number belonged could see private offers. Firms could make as many private and public offers as 
they wished during the market phase that lasted 150 seconds. Firms and workers could reach at 
maximum one trade agreement per period. Thus, if a worker accepted a firm’s offer, all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Of course effort must be observable for conditional renewability, yet if effort were to be perfectly observable by all 
parties, one could simply use forcing contracts.  Our design assumption that effort is fully observable is a short-cut 
for conditions under which there is a presumption that observable outcomes such as productivity are highly 
correlated with effort, but that effort is not verifiable in court (see Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006 for a clear 
example of this principle, as there the outcome is not deterministic even with full effort provided). In the extensive 
experimental gift-exchange literature, effort is traditionally observable by firms and workers, but is not contractible. 
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remaining offers submitted by that firm were immediately removed from the market. Also firms 
were kept constantly informed about which workers (ID numbers) had already accepted a 
contract, so as to avoid firms making a private offer to a worker that was no longer available. 
If a firm and a worker agreed on a contract, they entered a second phase in which the 
worker chose how much effort to provide. As desired efforts were not binding, workers only 
observed firm’s desired efforts but chose whichever effort level they preferred. 
Repeated transactions with the same trading partner were possible because subjects had 
fixed identification numbers (ID) and contract offers could be addressed to specific ID numbers.7 
Therefore, a firm could make offers to the same worker in consecutive periods and, if the worker 
accepted the offers, a long-term relationship was established.  
 In the third phase, workers faced an investment decision after obtaining their earnings in 
the labor market.  Firms knew of the existence of the investment stage but did not know which 
workers had invested.  Workers chose whether to invest a fixed amount of their profits (10 
points) in a project.  In order to obtain positive revenues from the investment project, workers 
needed to invest for at least eight consecutive periods.  Hence, workers could only initiate an 
investment project before period 12.8  Once a worker had initiated an investment project, this 
could result in negative revenues if the worker was unable to pay the required 10 points, either 
due to unemployment or low earnings in at least one of the seven subsequent periods.9  Workers 
had the opportunity of investing again in a new project if their previous investments had finished. 
 
Permanent-barrier treatment (PT1): This treatment is adapted from Falk, Huffman and 
MacLeod (2015). The only difference with respect to NT1 is that in this treatment a firm was 
compelled to offer a contract to a specific worker (private contract) providing that this worker 
had accepted a private offer from that firm in two consecutive periods; one might consider this to 
be a probationary period.10  In this case, only the worker could end the relationship.  In the 
contract offered to the worker, the wage had to be at least as large as the wage offered in the last 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 People were given a sheet with a summary table in which they could record all information of each trading period 
(wage, desired and actual effort, contract type, trading partner’s ID, own profits, and partner’s profits). 
8After period 11, the number of consecutive periods the worker could invest is less than 8, so that any investment 
would be lost. 
9 For simplicity, subjects were not allowed to save points for future periods. Thus, they are only allowed to invest 10 
points from their profits in the current period. While this is a strong constraint, we were reluctant to add further 
complexity. In any case, this feature is common to all treatments. 
10 In other words, if a worker accepted a private offer from a firm in period t, and then accepted a second private 
offer by the same firm in period t+1, the dismissal barrier took effect from period t+2 on. 
	   7	  
private offer. Whenever the worker did not accept the private firm’s offer, the firm's obligation to 
offer a contract to this worker ceased. 
 
Renewable-barrier Treatment (RT1): The only difference from PT1 is that under the 
automatic renewal procedure, a firm only had the obligation to offer a contract to a specific 
worker whenever this worker made an effort higher or equal to the desired effort requested by 
the firm in a private contract of the previous period.  That is, if in period t, the firm made a 
private offer to one specific worker, and the worker’s actual effort is at least as firm’s desired 
effort, then the firm was compelled to offer a private contract to this worker in period t+1.  In the 
private contract offered to the worker, the wage had to be at least as large as the wage offered in 
the last private offer but here the firm could change the desired effort.11 Note that in this 
treatment, firms can increase the desired effort as high as they want and that workers will be 
rehired only if they match this desired effort. In other words, we exogenously enforce that firms 
retain workers when the provided effort is at least as high as the desired effort) to investigate the 
effect of relating dismissal barriers to performance by comparing the results of PT1 and RT1. 
In the field, effort levels are hardly observable and may differ from performance. In our design, 
however, contract renewal is based only on effort levels. In this case, we consider observable 
effort levels to be a proxy for performance.12 We proceed in this manner in order to facilitate the 
comparison of our results to previous studies. 
 
The no-investment treatments 
 To further explore to what extent long-term investment projects are related to the 
decisions in the labor market, we conducted three additional treatments (one for each primary 
treatment) in which there was no possibility of investment.  These treatments are labeled NT2, 
PT2, and RT2.13 We summarize our treatments in Table 1: 
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 With this constraint workers may obtain at least the same “labor conditions” whenever they provide the effort 
desired by their employers.  
12 Other papers in the literature also use effort as a proxy for performance. For instance, Brown, Falk and Fehr 
(2004) and Falk, Huffman and MacLeod (2015), consider firms’ profits depending on observable effort levels and 
not on performance. 
13 Given our design, we ran five sessions in PT1, rather than four, in order to try to ensure that we had enough data 
of protected workers. 
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Table 1. Treatments 
Treatments Type of contract Investment stage Sessions Participants 
NT1 No dismissal barriers Yes 4 68 
RT1 Renewable barriers Yes 4 68 
PT1 Permanent barriers Yes 5 85 
NT2 No dismissal barriers No 2 34 
RT2 Renewable barriers No 2 34 
PT2 Permanent barriers No 2 34 
 
Parameters, Information and Payoff functions 
 All market sessions had 7 firms and 10 workers, to simulate conditions in which 
unemployment is present. The material payoffs for the firm,  𝜋!, and for the worker,   𝜋!, were 
given respectively by the functions: 
    𝜋! = 10𝑒 − 𝑤 if  a  contract  offer  was  accepted0                             if  no  contract  offer  was  accepted 
 
   𝜋! = 𝑤 − 𝑐(𝑒) if  a  contract  offer  was  accepted5                             if  no  contract  offer  was  accepted 
 
 
where  𝑒 is the effort level provided by the worker,  𝑤 is the wage offered by the firm, 𝑐(𝑒) 
represents the cost of effort function, and 5 is the unemployment profit in the case that a worker 
did not engage in a relationship.14 The desired effort level (ê) and the actual effort level chosen 
by the worker could take on integer values between 1 and 10. The range for the wage was 
[1,100]. The increasing and convex effort-cost function is shown in Table 2. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004) study how long-term relationships between trading parties can emerge endogenously 
in the absence of third-party enforcement of contracts. Brown, Falk and Fehr (2010) examine how the emergence of 
relational contracts changes in a market with excess demand for labor. Falk, Huffman and MacLeod (2015) focus on 
how permanent dismissal barriers affect contract enforcement, and on how the impact of these dismissal barriers 
depends on other institutional features, such as availability of bonus pay. Altmann, Falk, Grunewald and Huffman 
(forthcoming) give evidence of how involuntary unemployment and segmentation of labor markets may appear as a 
consequence of contractual incompleteness. 
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Table 2. Effort levels and costs of effort 
 
Effort e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
10 
 
Cost c(e) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 
 
18 
 
 
Denote by𝑡!"#$%&, the number of consecutive periods in which a worker invests. Then, the 
workers’ net profit from the investment stage,  𝜋!"#$%&, is: 
   𝜋!"#$%& = 𝑡!"#$%& ∗ (15− 10) if  𝑡!"#$%& ≥ 8−𝑡!"#$%! ∗ 10                     if  𝑡!"#$%& < 8  
 Payoff functions for workers and firms, including the effort cost function, were common 
information. Participants were aware that the market would last 18 periods.  It was feasible to 
form bi-lateral reputations, since firms learned about the effort choices of workers with whom 
they traded, but did not observe effort choices in interactions in which they were not a part.15 
 
 
3. Predictions 
This section will be structured as follows. We first analyze the benchmark setting when 
the investment stage is not present and we provide the predictions regarding the decisions related 
to the labor market. We, then, study the case in which investment is feasible. For this second 
case, we provide the predictions for the decisions related to the labor market as well as the 
predictions for investment decisions.  
 
3.1. Standard predictions   
For this analysis, we assume common knowledge of rationality and self-interest, so 
backward induction (in our finite horizon) allows us to calculate the solution in each treatment. 
 
3.1.1. No-investment treatments 
In the NT2 treatment, as Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004) state, each worker should choose 
minimal effort (e = 1) in each period regardless of the accepted contract (w, ê). Therefore, in all 
periods firms should offer contracts with w = 5, the minimum wage needed to induce workers to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Firms received information at the end of the period about worker’s ID and effort.  
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accept; all seven contract offers would be accepted.16 As Falk, Huffman and MacLeod (2015) 
state, the same outcome is predicted in the PT2 treatment. In addition, in both treatments, firms 
should be indifferent between making private and public offers because selfish workers will 
accept any offer that gives them payoffs as large as 5. Finally, we consider a long-term 
relationship to be when a firm and a worker engage in a private contract for at least 2 consecutive 
periods. Therefore, regarding the relative frequency of long-term relations, there should be no 
systematic differences across the NT2 and the PT2 treatments because the effort will be minimal 
in any case. 
With renewable barriers, a worker knows that the firm has the obligation to offer a 
contract to him whenever he makes an effort higher or equal to the desired effort requested by 
the firm in a private contract of the previous period.  In the RT2 treatment the predicted outcome 
depends on the assumptions made about workers being hired after not providing the effort level 
required by the firm. One assumption is that the probability of being re-hired is 0 (there are ID’s 
in the experiment). An alternative “no-retaliation” assumption is that the probability of being re-
hired is the same for all unemployed workers. We derive our predictions below and provide 
some intuition.   
If a worker will not be re-hired after not providing the requested effort, the firm’s 
equilibrium strategy is to make a private offer of w = 5 in period 1 and w = 23 in all subsequent 
periods, requesting e = 10 in every period.  The hired worker’s equilibrium strategy is to provide 
e = 10 in each of the first 17 periods and e = 1 in period 18.  There is no profitable deviation for 
the worker, since he earns 90 in 18 periods in this manner, the same as he would earn per period 
by not being employed (and the worker would never again be hired by a firm). Furthermore, 
deviating during periods 2-17 would mean sacrificing the large net payoff in period 18.17 The 
firm earns 1314 overall.  The firm cannot possibly do better, since she is getting maximum effort 
in every period but the last one and is paying the minimum needed to hire a worker. 
Suppose instead that a worker who has become unemployed by failing to provide the 
requested effort has the same chance of being hired as any other unemployed worker. Here the 
equilibrium is for the firm in all periods to make a private offer of w = 14 and request e = 10, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 We assume that a worker accepts a contract offer when indifferent or that the offer made includes an additional ε 
in utility. 
17 If one insists on strict preference rather than indifference and requires integer wages, the firm would offer w = 6 in 
period 1 and w = 23 in all later rounds.  The worker would then earn 91 for the 18 periods, more than the 90 
received by never being hired.  Note that the firm cannot also choose a low wage and request maximum effort in 
period 2. 
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for the worker to choose e = 10 in odd-numbered periods and e = 1 in even-numbered periods.  
In each pair of periods, an employed worker loses 4 in the odd-numbered period and gains 14 in 
the even-numbered periods.  His chance of being re-hired in the next odd period is 70%, since 
each worker follows the same strategy.  Workers earn 90 over 18 periods, while firms earn 82 in 
each pair of periods, or 738 overall.  Since firms earn considerably less in this equilibrium, firms 
would prefer the one in which they never hire a worker who has ever failed to supply the 
requested effort and would do so if they could convincingly commit to this retaliatory plan. Still, 
firms might anticipate that choosing w = 5 in period 1 signals that the first equilibrium is being 
played, so that we believe that this strategy will be selected by the firms and the corresponding 
equilibrium will result. Regarding private and public offers, here firms only make private offers 
that will be accepted by workers providing the requested effort level.  Therefore, with regard to 
the relative frequency of long-term relations, in RT2 all labor relations will be long-term ones. 
 
3.1.2. Investment treatments 
In the setting when the investment stage is present, the firms’ optimal strategies are the 
same in treatments NT1 and PTI as in treatments NT2 and PT2.  What may be surprising is that 
the equilibrium analysis is the same in RT1 as in RT2, unless firms are able to commit to a later 
wage increase in advance.  Here is why: Consider the following strategy for firms: Make private 
offers with w = 13 in periods 1-8, w = 14 in periods 9 and 10, and w = 28 in periods 11-18, 
requesting e = 10 in each period.  An employed worker would lose 5 in each of periods 1-8, 
would lose 4 in each of periods 9 and 10, would gain 10 in each of periods 11-17, and would 
gain 28 in period 18; the earnings from being employed are thus 50.  In addition, the worker 
would earn an investment profit of 40 for investing in the last eight periods, so the total earnings 
would be 90.  The firm would earn profits of 1354, higher than in RT2.  The worker has no 
profitable deviation. 
However, the firm has a profitable deviation of only paying a wage of 23 in periods 11-
18, since it is still a best response for a worker to accept this wage at any such point in time.  
Therefore, the worker will not find this strategy to be plausible unless there is some form of 
credible enforcement that w = 28 will be paid in the last eight periods. Thus, without such 
enforcement there is no improvement for the firms over the strategy in RT2, since the minimum 
total wage is paid that can achieve e = 10 in all periods but the last.  
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We summarize these predictions in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Labor market predictions with selfish preferences  
 Investment treatments No-investment treatments 
 NT1 PT1 RT1 NT2 PT2 RT2N RT2C 
Wage in period 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 13 
Wage in periods 2-8 5 5 23 5 5 23 13 
Wage in periods 9-10 5 5 23 5 5 23 14 
Wages in periods 11-18 5 5 23 5 5 23 28 
        
ê in period 1 1 1 10 1 1 10 10 
ê in periods 2-18 1 1 10 1 1 10 10 
        
Actual e in period 1-17 1 1 10 1 1 10 10 
Actual e in period 18 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
        
Total firm earnings 90 90 1314 90 90 1314 1354 
Total worker earnings  90 90 90 90 90 90 90 
Note: Predictions assuming risk neutrality, own-payoff maximization and common knowledge.  ê refers to requested 
effort.  RT2N refers to the no-commitment case, while RT2C refers to the commitment case. 
 
Regarding the investment decisions, workers will not invest in long-term projects in any 
of the three treatments where investments are available. The predicted profits that workers obtain 
in each round are five points; therefore they will not be able to invest, since they need to invest a 
fixed amount of 10 points to initiate an investment project. 
In sum, regarding the standard theory, the main predictions are the following: i) there 
should be no differences in the effort levels provided by workers between the Investment 
treatments and the No-investment treatments; ii) Workers should not invest in any treatment 
where long-term projects are available; and iii) linking performance to dismissal barriers should 
lead workers to provide higher effort levels, increasing the number of private offers and giving 
rise to more long-term relationships. 
 
3.2. Behavioral predictions 
In line with the exercise developed in Altmann, Falk, Grunewald and Huffman (2014), 
we offer some intuitions about behavioral predictions. This subsection is intended to provide 
some general thoughts rather than to present a deep and exhaustive analysis.  
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3.2.1. No-investment treatments 
 In the NT2 treatment, if firms believe that there is a sufficient proportion of “fair” 
workers, there is also an equilibrium in which firms offer wages above the exit option, workers 
provide non-minimal effort, and long-term relationships are formed via private contracts.18 The 
intuition for this result is that the possibility of future rents in the form of higher wages gives 
selfish workers the incentive to provide non-minimal effort levels and mimic the behavior of fair 
workers until the final period, when there is no future.  Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004) and Falk, 
Huffman and McLeod (2015) find empirical support for this equilibrium, which is also present in 
our experiment, although with a lower frequency.  Perhaps firms in our study believe that the 
proportion of fair workers is lower than what firms believe in the other two studies. 
 In the PT2 treatment, Falk, Huffman and McLeod (2015) find a negative effect once 
dismissal barriers are activated, since selfish workers assure themselves future rents and have no 
further motives to provide non-minimal effort levels. Thus, they find a decrease in effort levels 
in long-term relations (in relation to NT2). As a result, they find that firms are reluctant to enter 
long-term relationships. Our prediction is therefore that there will be fewer long-term 
relationships in this treatment.  In fact, we replicate this result controlling for the wage effect 
(including wages as an explanatory variable). 
 Predictions for the RT2 treatment are as follows. On one hand, effort levels will be higher 
than in the other two types of contracts. As with the NT2 treatment, in the early periods workers 
wish to signal that they are “fair” workers and worth retaining with a private contract in the next 
period. They will then match the desired effort by the firms in order to be rehired in the next 
period. On the other hand, the key difference with respect to PT2 is that now firms have a device 
to prevent workers from shirking. As a consequence, there will be a larger number of long-term 
relationships in PT2 since firms will be considerably less reluctant to form long-term 
relationships in that case. 
3.2.2. Investment treatments 
How will the presence of the investment stage affect the labor market? Workers who 
invest (and the potential profits are attractive) will try to secure employment over at least eight 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See Brown, Falk, and Fehr (2004) for details.  Fair workers respond with an increase in effort levels to high wages 
and with a decrease to low ones. 
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consecutive periods.  Firms should realize that workers who invest are likely to provide higher 
effort in the interest of keeping their jobs and thus avoiding losses from their investments. Thus, 
we predict a larger frequency of non-minimal effort levels and long-term relationships in the 
contracts when the investment stage is present than when there is no possibility of investment.  
 In fact, fair-minded workers might well reject offers that hold them close to their 
reservation wage.  A glance at the last row of Table 3 shows that the predicted workers’ payoffs 
under the assumption of selfish preferences are equal to the reservation wage. The imbalance in 
the number of firms and workers might well temper the desire to reject low offers (see for 
example, Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Zamir, 1991); however, studies such as Brandts 
and Charness (2004) show that wages are well above the reservation price even when there are 
12 workers and eight firms in a market (an imbalance that is similar to ours).  In addition, people 
have shown a strong affinity to social efficiency (see Charness and Rabin, 2002, e.g.), so that we 
suspect that the presence of such agents will lead to higher-than-minimal effort in the NT and PT 
treatments and high effort with high wages in the RT treatments, with investment in RT1.19 
 While we don’t expect the theoretical predictions to hold quantitatively with behavioral 
agents, we nevertheless expect the qualitative predictions to hold. Specifically, we expect a 
larger frequency of non-minimal effort levels and long-term relationships in the contracts when 
investment is feasible than when it is not.  And to the extent that firms are sympathetic to worker 
investment, we would expect them to provide more wage/effort request combinations that would 
yield a sufficient amount of units to allow workers to invest. We also expect that there should be 
higher wages, higher effort, and more compliance with requested effort in the RT treatments 
compared to the NT and PT treatments (same prediction as the standard theory).    
 
4. Results 
In this section we first study decisions within the labor market. In particular, we focus on 
the effect of two potential drivers of effort: long-term projects and dismissal barriers. Second, we 
analyze the investment decisions and to what extent these are affected by what happened inside 
the labor market. Throughout this section, we will test whether differences found between 
treatments are statistically significant, as follows. Since our sample has a panel-data structure, we 
use a GLS random-effects model if the variable of interest is continuous and a Probit/Logit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 This is even more likely with rich communication.  For example, Brandts, Charness, and Ellman (2016) find that 
the highest effort level is consistently provided when it is accompanied by an even split between the parties. 
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random effects model if it is binary. As we have three treatments, we omit one treatment dummy 
in each specification and then conduct the corresponding test of  the treatment dummies. We 
consider robust standard errors clustered at an individual level and control for time trends. 
Throughout this section, our statistics reflect one-tailed tests unless stated otherwise. 
[Table 4 here] 
 
4.1. Labor market decisions 
4.1.1. The effect of long-term projects on effort levels 
To provide a general view of the effect that the possibility of investing has on workers’ 
decisions, we first analyze the extent to which the mere presence of long-term investments 
affects effort levels. Figure 1 plots, for each treatment, the average effort level over time with 
and without investment stage. Results show that, contrary to the theoretical predictions with 
selfish preferences (see Table 3), the overall effort level provided by workers is larger when 
subjects had the chance of investing relative to the case where investment was not feasible. 
Differences are statistically different (p < 0.001, p = 0.001 and p = 0.078, for NT1 vs NT2, PT1 
vs PT2 and RT1 vs RT2, respectively). This finding suggests that the presence of the long-term 
investments acts as an effort-enforcement device. In fact, the differences between treatments 
regarding effort levels are reduced when the investment stage is present, so the NT and PT 
treatments are closer to the RT condition (p < 0.001 and p < 0.001, for RT1-NT1 vs RT2-NT2 
and RT1-PT1 vs RT2-PT2, respectively). 
The former result is more consistent with the behavioral predictions in which workers 
provide higher effort levels in the investment treatments. Thus, providing a high effort level 
increases the probability of being re-hired, generating longer relationships that could be more 
profitable since it increases the chance of successful investment. In fact, we find that the 
existence of the investment stage changes the distribution of the length of the relationship, 
generating a lower number of one-shot interactions and a larger number of long-term 
relationships (in which a firm and a worker engage in a private contract for two periods or more), 
particularly in the NT and PT treatments (9%, 20% and 55% versus 41%, 41% and 68% in the 
NT, PT and RT, respectively).20 This result is contrary to the standard theoretical predictions in 
which the number of long-relationships is unchanged with the presence of the investment stage. 
However, the behavioral predictions are in line with an increased in the long-term relationships 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Mann Whitney tests: Z = 3.364, p = 0.000; Z = 2.206, p = 0.014; and Z = 0.161, p = 0.873 (two-tailed), for the 
comparisons between NT1 and NT2, PT1 and PT2, and RT1 and RT2, respectively. 
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when workers have the possibility of investment. The number of long-term relationships in a 
treatment is a key factor to having higher effort levels and higher profits. From Table 4, we can 
see that effort levels are statistically higher in long-term and short-term relationships for all 
treatments, both with and without investment.21 This is also true when we consider total 
earnings.22 In sum, the increase in long-term relations, especially in the NT and PT treatments 
when investment is present, is what drives the enhancement in effort levels and social efficiency. 
 
Figure 1a: Average effort levels over time in NT treatments 
 
 
Figure 1b: Average effort levels over time in PT treatments 
 
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21  p < 0.001, p = 0.017, p < 0.001, p < 0.001, p < 0.001, p < 0.001, for NT1, PT1, RT1, NT2 and RT2, respectively.  
22  p < 0.001, p = 0.014, p < 0.001, p < 0.001, p < 0.001, p < 0.001, for NT1, PT1, RT1, NT2 and RT2, respectively.  
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Figure 1c: Average effort levels over time in RT treatments 
 
 
 
A second factor is that having the investment stage as a potential second source of 
income gives workers room to be more generous towards firms. Despite increasing their effort 
levels when investment is feasible, workers’ non-investment profits are a bit higher in the 
investment treatments although not statistically significant (see Table 4, p = 0.291, p = 0.651 
and p = 0.998, two-tailed tests, for NT1 vs NT2, PT1 vs PT2 and RT1 vs RT2, respectively). On 
the contrary, firms’ profits increase (mainly significantly) when workers can invest in long-term 
projects (p < 0.001, p = 0.225 and p = 0.003, for NT1 vs NT2, PT1 vs PT2 and RT1 vs RT2, 
respectively). As a result, total payoffs in just the labor market are substantially higher in each 
treatment with the possibility of investment than in each corresponding treatment without 
investment, and significantly except for the PT treatment (p < 0.001, p < 0.001 and p = 0.015, for 
NT1 vs NT2, PT1 vs PT2 and RT1 vs RT2, respectively).23 It seems that giving workers a share 
in the future yields dividends both for the firm and socially; this is made feasible by the potential 
investment earnings.  
Result 1: The mere presence of the investment stage leads to higher effort levels, particularly in 
the NT and PT treatments. As a result, effort levels in the former treatments are closer to those in 
the RT condition when investment is feasible. Also, we see higher firm profits and increased 
social payoffs. The enhancement in the investment treatments seems to be driven by a larger 
number of long-term relationships.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 From Table 4, the comparisons are 48.72/30.85, 49.56/34.60, and 60.59/53.48 for NT, PT and RT, respectively.  
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We next focus only on treatments with the investment option, to check whether workers 
actually engaged in a long-term project also provide higher effort levels or not. In order to 
examine in more depth the determinants of effort, we use a two-step GMM (Generalized Method 
of Moments) estimator of Arellano-Bond with the Windmeijer correction (which corrects the 
variance to avoid consistency issues in small samples), using lagged levels of the dependent 
variable (individual effort) and other endogenous variables as instruments (Arellano and Bond, 
1991; Windmeijer, 2005).24 This approach is appropriate to our setting since we have a potential 
endogeneity problem (due to possible repeated interaction with the same partner; subjects are 
aware that ID’s can be tracked) and we do not have exogenous variables to use as valid 
instruments. The advantage of this procedure is that lagged endogenous and predetermined 
variables are used as instruments;25 this method is also valid for panel data structure.  The 
Hansen test (see penultimate row of Table 5) checks the validity of the instruments used.26   
Finally, we also provide a test of serial auto-correlation to confirm whether the 
endogeneity problem is present. If one of these tests is significant, then using another model that 
does not account for endogeneity (e.g., a random-effects General Least Square model with no 
instrumental variables) is inappropriate, because we could overestimate or underestimate the 
coefficients of the regressors. These tests are also useful for knowing how many lags of the 
dependent variable we should include as explanatory variables. We consider two lags of the 
dependent variable (Effort t-1 and Effort t-2) since the Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) is 
significant and the analogous one for AR(1) is not significant (see antepenultimate row of Table 
5).27 Although we consider many explanatory variables, for now we will only focus our analysis 
in the dummy variable long-term project (which takes the value 1 if the worker has initiated an 
investment project 0 otherwise). The other explanatory variables will be defined and examined 
later in the dismissal-barrier section. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Other studies that use the same methodology are Ashley, Ball and Eckel (2003), Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) 
and Brañas, Buchelia, Espinosa, and García-Muñoz (2013).  
25 To be more specific, the method of Arellano-Bond categorized the instruments into endogenous/predetermined 
(the ones that vary with time) and independent (time invariant, for example treatment dummies). 
26	  A reviewer suggests that endogeneity problems basically cannot be solved without instruments, so that the GMM 
procedure may not fully address it; one may wish to be cautious in interpreting these results. 
27 Note that the null hypothesis for AR(1) is that the dependent variable follows an autocorrelation process 
exclusively of order 1. We have also included a third lag of the dependent variable in the regressions of Table 2 but 
the coefficient is always insignificant. 
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Table 5 presents the results of different specifications in the three treatments.28 The 
coefficient of the long-term project dummy is positive and strongly statistically significant in  all 
three treatments. When workers have invested in a long-term project outside the labor market, 
they increase their effort level.  The intuition behind this result seems clear. In order to make 
positive earnings from the project, the worker must be employed at least for eight consecutive 
periods. As the probability of being rehired is increasing with the effort level, workers may have 
additional incentives to raise their efforts in order to maximize the probability of getting a 
contract in subsequent periods.  
[Table 5 here] 
This intuition does not hold in PT1, where a contract may be protected regardless of 
effort choices.  In fact, protected workers have incentives to reduce their effort levels to increase 
their profits (as indicated by the negative and significant coefficient of protected on specification 
7 of Table 5). Nevertheless, the increase in effort levels by workers without a protected contract 
investing more than compensates for this, and the total effect of investing on effort levels is 
positive (as seen in the coefficient of long-term projects in specification 6 of Table 5). 
 
Result 2: When workers are engaged in a long-term project out of the labor market, they 
improve their performance inside the labor market. 
 
4.1.2. The effect of dismissal barriers on effort levels 
We now analyze how different dismissal barriers affect effort levels, earnings, and the 
length of the labor relationships. We start by analyzing treatments with the investment stage.  
Althought effort levels in NT1 and PT1 (RT1) are significantly larger (lower) than those 
predicted by the theory, results show that, in accordance to the predictions stated in Table 3, 
there is almost no difference in average effort levels between NT1 and PT1; this difference is 
significantly higher in RT1 than in NT1 and PT1. Here, we consider a GLS random effects 
model on effort levels and we pool data from all three treatments, there are three explanatory 
variables: the baseline dummy, which is 1 if the observation is in NT1 and 0 otherwise, the 
permanent dummy, which is 1 if the observation is in PT1 and 0 otherwise, and the renewal 
dummy, which is 1 if the observation is in RT1 and 0 otherwise. To check each pairwise 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Note that the explanatory variables desired effort and wage are not considered together in the NT1 and PT1 
treatments. This is due to the fact that we find a significant correlation between them. Therefore, they should not be 
included in the same regression (Greene, 2003).  
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comparison between treatments we include the two corresponding dummies. Differences are 
statistically significant except for NT1 and PT1 (p = 0.898, two-tailed; p = 0.005 and p = 0.004, 
for NT1 versus PT1, NT1 versus RT1 and PT1 versus RT1, respectively).  
As standard theory predicts with selfish preferences, firms request a higher effort level in 
RT1 than in NT1.  Results in Table 4 show that desired effort levels (8.52 and 7.82 for RT1 and 
NT1, respectively) are significantly higher in RT1 than in NT1 (p = 0.012).29  Despite firms 
being more demanding in RT1, we find that the distance between the desired and the actual 
effort is significantly smaller in RT1 than in the other two treatments.30  The dynamic generated 
by performance-based dismissal barriers (i.e., firms requesting a higher effort level and workers 
providing an effort level closer to what is desired) explains why effort levels are larger in RT1 
than in NT1. This dynamic also leads to an increase of the proportion of long-term relationships 
in RT as predicted in the standard theory with selfish preference. In particular, 41% of the trades 
in NT1 and PT1 were in long-term relationships compared to 68% in RT1. These differences are 
statistically significant (Mann Whitney tests, Z = 2.654, p = 0.004 and Z = 3.670, p = 0.000, for 
RT1 vs. NT1 and RT1 vs. PT1, respectively).  This is not the case between NT1 and PT1 (two-
tailed Mann Whitney tests, Z = 0.130, p = 0.898).  
Turning to firms’ decisions, standard theory with selfish preferences predicts higher 
wages in RT1. Results partially confirm this prediction: Overall wages are significantly higher in 
RT1 than in NT1 (p = 0.048) but insignificantly higher than in PT1 (p = 0.617, two-tailed test). 
However, the differences across treatments are modest when we separately consider wages in 
long-term and short-term relationships. Note that although wages are higher in both 
environments in PT1 than in RT1, wages in long-term relationships in NT1 are higher than in 
short-term relationships in RT1 (53.62 vs. 41.59) and the proportion of long-term relations in 
RT1 is larger than in PT1 (68% vs. 41%). Thus, the higher overall wage in RT1 is the result of 
the much higher proportion of long-term relationships in RT1.   
Regarding earnings, in accordance to the theoretical predictions, renewable dismissal 
barriers do not substantially affect worker earnings with respect to the other two treatments.  
Although workers’ earnings (without the investment stage) are larger in PT1 than in RT1 and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  For this analysis, we only focus on the comparison between RT1 and NT1. We exclude PT1 since workers could 
have two different motivations when they receive a private offer. If workers have not reached a permanent position 
they could have incentives to match the effort level demanded by the company. However, once they achieve the 
permanent position this incentive could disappear. This fact could distort the comparison with RT1 and NT1.	  
30 p = 0.523 (two-tailed), p = 0.024 and p = 0.005, for NT1/PT1, NT1/RT1 and PT1/RT1, respectively. 
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larger in RT1 than in NT1, these differences are not significant (p = 0.434 and p = 0.439, two-
tailed tests, for the respective comparisons between RT1 and PT1 and between RT1 and NT1). 
Also as predicted, firms earn considerably more (more than twice as much as in NT1 and more 
than 50 percent more than in PT1) with renewable dismissal barriers, since effort is appreciably 
higher (reflecting the higher proportion of long-term relationships in RT1). These differences are 
quite significant (p < 0.001 and p = 0.002, for the respective comparisons). 
If we consider social efficiency (total profits) without taking into account the profits from 
the investment stage, results show that performance-based dismissal barriers still lead to a 
substantially better outcome than in the other contractual environments. The differences between 
NT1 and RT1 and between RT1 and PT1 are statistically significant (p = 0.007 and p = 0.006, 
respectively). This result is also in line with the theoretical predictions. Once more, as in the 
comparison between investment and no-investment treatments, the larger number of long-term 
relationships seems to be driving the better performance of RT1 respect to the other two 
treatments. 
Now we analyze whether these findings still hold in treatments without the investment 
stage.  As before, the presence of renewable dismissal barriers also leads firms to request higher 
effort levels and workers to reduce the gap between the desired and actual effort, thus providing 
higher effort levels: i) effort levels in RT2 are significantly larger than in NT2 (p < 0.001); ii) 
desired effort levels in RT2 are significantly larger than in NT2 (p < 0.001); and iii), differences 
between the desired and the effort level provided by the worker are significantly lower in RT2 
than in NT2 (p = 0.025). 
Similarly, the existence of renewable dismissal barriers leads to more long-term 
relationships. Differences are statistically significant for the comparisons between NT2 and RT2 
and between RT2 and PT2, respectively (Mann Whitney tests, Z = 3.154, p = 0.008 and Z = 
2.629, p = 0.005).   
Regarding earnings in the no-investment treatments, we observe that again relating 
performance to dismissal barriers does not greatly affect workers’ earnings (coefficients of the 
treatment dummies: p = 0.234 and p = 0.872, two-tailed tests, for NT2 vs. RT2 and PT2 vs. RT2, 
respectively) but it does greatly increase firms’ profits (p < 0.001 and p < 0.001, respectively), 
and total earnings (p < 0.001 and p = 0.003, respectively). 
We summarize the previous findings in the following result: 
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Result 3: Relating performance to dismissal barriers leads to higher effort levels, greater firms’ 
profits and total earnings both when the investment is feasible and when it is not. Once more, 
this enhancement seems to be driven by a larger number of long-term relationships. 
Since the main differences between treatments have been examined, we will now focus 
our attention on the determinants of effort levels. We will restrict our analysis to the investment 
treatments since they have a richer setting with a larger set of variables. To this aim, we use the 
method explained at the beginning of the results section: the two-step GMM estimator of 
Arellano-Bond with the Windmeijer correction. 
As explanatory variables we introduce: i) effort t-1 and effort t-2, which denote the effort 
provided by the workers in one and two previous periods, respectively, ii) private, a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the effort is provided with a private offer and 0 otherwise, iii) 
wage, the wage received by the worker, iv) desired effort, the desired effort demanded by the 
firm, v) Cumulative unemployment, the cumulative number of periods in which the worker has 
been unemployed vi) cumulative profits, the cumulative profits obtained by the worker, vii) long-
term project, a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the worker has initiated an investment 
project 0 otherwise, viii) protected contract, a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the effort 
is provided when the worker was protected against dismissal and 0 otherwise, ix) Same firm 2 
periods, a dummy variable that is 1 if the worker has been hired by the same firm for 2 
consecutive periods with a private offer and is 0 otherwise, and x) Same firm 8 periods, a dummy 
variable that is 1 if the worker has been hired by the same firm for 8 consecutive periods and is 0 
otherwise. We also control for time trends by including the variable period. 
Table 5 presents the results of different specifications in the three treatments. We see that 
Private has a positive and significant effect on effort in all treatments. However, specification (6) 
shows that once workers are protected against dismissals in PT1, they significantly reduce effort.  
This suggests that the positive effect of Private comes mainly from the first private offer 
received by the worker. On the other hand, Protected contract has a positive and significant 
effect on effort in RT1.  So a dismissal barrier contingent on performance is an effective device 
for increasing workers’ effort levels. In addition, desired effort has a highly-significant positive 
effect on effort levels. As in previous studies (e.g., Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1993; Brown, 
Falk and Fehr, 2004; Charness et al., 2012) wages have a positive and significant effect on effort.  
Regarding the length of the relationship, being hired with a private offer by the same firm 
for at least two consecutive periods has a positive effect on effort levels in all treatments. This 
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may be due to the fact that workers want to build a good reputation in order to be rehired in the 
future and avoid unemployment. This effect is especially high in RT1 and PT1 where there is an 
additional benefit: gaining a protected contract. As we saw before, being protected has a negative 
effect on workers’ effort in PT1, so it seems that the positive effect of being hired by the same 
firm for two consecutive periods in this treatment is driven mainly by the high effort in the first 
of these periods (in order to obtain the protected contract). 
Along this line, being hired by the same firm for eight consecutive periods has a negative 
effect in NT1 and PT1; the effect is positive only in RT1. In PT1 the explanation seems obvious 
because it is very likely that the worker is in a protected contract, so he has no incentives to 
provide high effort levels. In contrast, in RT1 workers have incentives to increase their effort to 
preserve the privilege of a protected contract. In NT1, one possible intuition is that being hired 
by the same firm for eight consecutive periods implies that it is close to the end of the 
experiment. So, the negative effect on effort could be related to the end-of-the-world effect. 
Supporting the latter intuition is the fact that 50% of relationships involving at least eight 
consecutive periods reach the eighth consecutive period during the last 4 periods of NT1. 
Similarly, Cumulative unemployment has a negative and significant effect on effort in all 
treatments. We speculate that a worker who is unemployed for many periods behaves 
myopically, compensating for low past earnings by reducing her effort level when hired. 
Cumulative profit has a positive and significant effect on the effort level provided by the worker.  
This suggests that workers improve their performance when they receive high earnings.31   
         
4.2 Investment decisions 
In this section we analyze whether and how the conditions in the labor market influcence 
the decision to undertake a long-term project oustide the labor market. Since the success of these 
investments crucially depends on keeping a job for at least eight consecutive periods, we group 
the labor relationships for the three different institutions into two categories: Relationships of 
one to seven periods and relationships of eight periods or more. As stated previously, the labor 
institution that generates the largest percentage of long-lasting relationships is the performance-
based dismissal barrier. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 We have also conducted the same specifications on Table 5 for a GLS (General Least Square) random-effects 
model and significance results are quite similar although quantitatively they differ somewhat. 
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Table 6 shows the percentage of workers undertaking investment projects, the average 
number of investments per investing worker and the likelihood of success (positive earnings) of 
these investments as well as the average profit from investment.32 
Despite standard theory (selfish preferences) predicting no investments in any treatment, 
data show that workers invest under the three contractual conditions. This is more in line with 
the behavioral predictions. In particular, the percentage of workers investing in NT1 is higher 
than in PT1 and RT1 (75% vs. 48% and 55%, respectively).33 Thus, both in PT1 and RT1, 
dismissal barriers appear to act as a reference point for workers, in the sense that most seem to 
wait to be protected against dismissal before investing. Where a protected situation is feasible, 
workers may wait until they have it before initiating an investment project.34 
Table 6. Investments, success rates, and profits 
Category NT1 PT1 RT1 
% workers who ever invested 75% 48% 55% 
Average number of investments per investing worker  1.41 1.54 1.14 
%successful investments 29% 38% 68% 
% investments initiated with public contract (% success) 46% (21%) 49% (11%)  24% (17%) 
% investments initiated with private contract (% success)                   54% (36%) 51% (63%) 76% (84%) 
% investments initiated with protection (% success) -- 24% (100%) 72% (83%) 
Average investingworkers’ profits from investment 1.33 16.25 43.86 
Number of workers 40 50 40 
 
Success rates are low with public contracts, but much higher with private contracts. 
Again, dismissal barriers seem to drive this result. In NT1 these protected positions are not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Figure B in Appendix B shows the percentage of workers investing in each period. 
33 The differences between NT1 and PT1 or RT1 are statistically significant (p = 0.042 and p = 0.015, respectively), 
while those between PT1 and RT1 are not (p = 0.723, two-tailed test). 
34Results show that the average number of investments per investing worker is much lower in RT1 than in PT1 and 
NT1. The differences in rates between RT1 and PT1 and between RT1 and NT1 are statistically significant (Z = 
2.053, p = 0.020; Z = 2.083, p = 0.019, respectively), while those between PT1 and NT1 are not (Z = 0.121, p = 
0.904, two-tailed Mann Whitney test). This could reflect the fact that the percentage of successful investments is 
68% in RT1, so there is no need for workers to invest more thant once.  However, the percentage of successful 
investments is only 29% and 38% for NT1 and PT1, respectively. So, here workers could invest again after earlier 
investments failed. 
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feasible, so the success rate with private contracts is much lower than in PT1 and RT1 (36% vs. 
63% and 84%, respectively).35  In spite of this, in NT1 workers keep investing even after several 
failed attempts. This is not entirely foolish, since the expected payoff is still positive even with 
the observed 29 percent success rate. However, investments made under a public contract have a 
negative expected return in all treatments, so that these are mistakes ex post.   
For RT1, the number of investment projects undertaken with a private contract is 
significantly larger than with a public contract (Z = 2.714, p = 0.003). Moreover, 72% (18 out of 
25) of investments were made with a protected contract in RT1.36 In PT1, however, results in 
only 24 percent (9 out of 37) of investments are initiated when subjects had a safe position and 
49 percent (18 out of 37) of projects were initiated with a public contract; only 16 percent of all 
initial private contracts were renewed for a second period. So, although here workers also have 
the opportunity to obtain a permanent position, the conditions for attaining it are much tougher 
than in RT1.  If workers believe that it will be very difficult to reach a permanent contract, they 
will not wait until obtaining it to undertake a project (unlike the RT1 treatment). These results 
support the notion that workers feel that it is very difficult to reach a permanent job, so that most 
of them undertake their investment projects without waiting for a safer position.37 
When we focus on when these investments were undertaken, we see that in the first five 
periods of NT1 and PT1most investments were initiated with a public contract (61% in NT1 and 
75% in PT1); in contrast, these were mostly initiated with a private contract (62%) in the RT1 
treatment. However, there is learning over time; in the second half of the periods with investment 
stage (from period 6 to 11), most investments were undertaken with a private contract (72%, 
100%, and 92% in NT1, PT1 and RT1 respectively). This result reinforces the idea that some 
(more patient) workers waited for a safer job position to undertake investment projects. Having a 
contract from a private offer increases the probability of undertaking an investment project by 
9.24, 27.70, and 10.60 percentage points, respectively.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 The differences between NT1 and PT1 or RT1 are statistically significant (p = 0.034 and p < 0.001, respectively), 
while those between PT1 and RT1 are not (p = 0.223, two-tailed). 
36 In only one case out of 19 did a worker with a private contract invest and then fail to provide the requested effort. 
37 This helps to shed some light on why the proportion of workers who invested is lower in RT1 than in NT1.  
Indeed, 18 of the 40 workers in RT1 never invested.  Of these, six workers never received a private offer and five 
others had a stable situation and yet decided not to invest for some reason (perhaps they did not fully understand the 
investment or were extremely risk averse). In fact, there were considerably more cases of multiple investments in 
NT1 and PT1 than in RT1, since successful investments do not need to be repeated.  In NT1, seven workers out of 
30 who invested did so multiple times; in PT1, this was true for eight of the 24 investing workers in PT1.  In 
contrast, only two of the 22 investing workers invested more than once in RT1. 
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In order to analyze in more depth the main determinants of the investment decision, Table 
7 shows the results of a Probit random-effects model in which the dependent variable is the 
probability of undertaking an investment project (periods where the project is already ongoing 
are excluded from the analysis, as it was not feasible to then initiate an investment project).38 The 
explanatory variables are: i) a dummy that takes the value 1 when the worker initiates the 
investment with a private offer and 0 the worker initiates the investment with a public offer 
(private), ii) a dummy that takes the value 1 when the worker initiates the investment with a 
protected contract and 0 otherwise (protected contract),39 iii) the cumulative profits, iv) the 
individual cumulative unemployment and v) the cumulative failed projects.40  
[Table 7 here] 
Table 7 shows that having a contract from a private offer increases the probability of 
undertaking an investment project in all treatments.41 In the same vein, having a protected 
contract leads to a larger probability of initiating an investment. Both results are quite intuitive. 
If workers assign a larger probability to the fact of having a contract in subsequent periods, they 
will be more likely to undertake the investment project. In this sense, a private contract could 
beconsidered as a signal of a larger probability of being rehired, leading to a larger probability of 
investing.42 With a protected contract, assigning this high probability is straightforward. 
Rows four to six in Table 7 analyze the effect of past outcomes on the probability of 
undertaking a project. Row four shows that the cumulative profits the worker has obtained from 
the labor market have a positive influence on the investment decision. The reason behind this 
result could be twofold. On the one hand, large profits are related to the fact of being hired for 
many periods. Thus, workers will assign more probability to having a job in the future, leading to 
a larger probability of investment. On the other hand, the larger the profits obtained by the 
worker, the lower the relative cost of failing in an investment project.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 For this analysis, we do not consider the previous Arellano-Bond model since this is appropriate for continuous 
dependent variables and we think that here the endogeneity issue is diminished since firms are not aware of which 
workers have initiated an investment project. 
39 Protected contract is defined according to our design as a contract that fulfills the 2 consecutive private offers in 
PT1 or a contract in which the desired effort is fulfilled in a private offer in RT1. 
40 The pairs of explanatory variables cumulative unemployment and protected contract, and protected contract and 
cumulative unemployment are highly correlated in the RT treatment, so are not included in the same specification. 
This is also the case for cumulative profits and protected contract or private contract in the PT treatment. 
41 Sample sizes differ because periods where initiating the project was not feasible are excluded from the analysis.   
42 In fact, in RT1 a private offer could mean (if worker provides the desired effort demanded by the company) a 
protected contract. 
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We also see (row five in Table 7) that the more periods since the worker became 
unemployed, the lower the probability of investing. That could be due to the fact that when 
workers have been unemployed for many periods, they are more aware of the possibility of being 
unemployed in subsequent periods and so losing the money invested. Hence, they will be more 
reluctant to invest. Finally, row six shows that the number of cumulative failed projects leads 
workers to invest more. We speculate that this result could be due to workers trying to recover 
from losses by undertaking a new project. 
Turning to success rates, Table 6 shows that there is a much higher percentage of 
successful investments in RT1 than in either NT1 or PT1. The differences are statistically 
significant between RT1 and the other treatments (coefficient of the treatment dummy when the 
dependent variable is the probability of a succesful investment, p = 0.003 and p = 0.016, one-
tailed tests, respectively), but not for the NT1/PT1 comparison (p = 0.446, two-tailed test). As 
expected, success rates were very high when workers had achieved a protected position when 
initiating an investment.   
The higher success rates in RT1 naturally leads to larger earnings from the investment 
project. While in NT1 and PT1 workers’ average investment earnings are 1.33 and 16.25, 
respectively, in RT1 these earnings increase strongly to 43.86. Differences are statistically 
significant between RT1 and NT1 and RT1 vs PT1 (p = 0.021 and p = 0.052, respectively) but 
not between NT1 and PT1 (p = 0.595, two-tailed test). Thus, results show that when workers 
have the unilateral ability to automatically renew their contracts, they earn much more with their 
investments. 
Result 4: Relating performance to dismissal barriers in the labor market drives workers to 
undertake a higher percentage of succesful investment projects and consequently to obtain much 
higher investment returns. 
 
To the extent that our data show a link between investment and dismissal barriers, this 
may have important ramifications for labor policy.  Since long-term investments would generally 
seem to be rather beneficial for society, it may be worthwhile to encourage these; reducing 
uncertainty by having appropriate dismissal barriers may be a fruitful approach. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We study how some crucial decisions that people must make outside of the labor market 
affect performance and productivity in the labor market and vice versa, i.e., how labor market 
conditions affect workers’ willingness to get involved in long-term projects. Having a strong 
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degree of stability in employment has been one of the historical main aspirations of the working 
population. Trade unions have pursued employment protection (dismissal barriers) as a 
mechanism to help achieve this stability.  
There are two polar cases. In environments such as the private sector in the U.S., 
dismissal is typically on an at-will basis, so that insecurity about future employment is likely to 
deter such investment.  At the other extreme, non-performance-based and permanent dismissal 
barriers (present to some degree in many European labor markets) provide little or no incentive 
for workers to perform at a high level. This may have a very adverse effect on worker 
productivity and firm profitability.  
In this article, we examine how labor market decisions are affected by incorporating the 
opportunity for workers to invest in long-term projects. Contrary to the theoretical predictions 
with selfish preferences, we find that the mere presence of long-term projects acts as an effort-
enforcement device. This result seem to be driven by an increase in long-term relationships. 
Workers perceived additional incentives to enhance their performance when they had the option 
of investing in a long-term project. We also study the importance of connecting job security to 
performance by introducing dismissal barriers that are based on recent performance and 
comparing it with non performance-based dismissal barriers. Firms should be cautious when 
choosing the threshold workers have to reach in order to get their renewal. If this threshold is 
very high, workers might feel that it is very difficult to reach the goal. This fact could discourage 
workers from trying to reach the threshold, leading to lower effort levels and lower firms’ 
profits. We also find that the presence of dismissal barriers in the labor market has a relevant 
consequence on investment decisions. They appear to act as a reference point for workers, in the 
sense that most seem to wait to be protected against dismissal before investing. 
Relating dismissal barriers to performance leads to three interesting results. First, as 
predicted, overall worker productivity is higher when there are performance-based dismissal 
barriers than when there are either no dismissal barriers or non-performance-based ones.  
Second, the larger number of long-term relationships corresponds to a higher effort level and, as 
a consequence, greater profits for firms. With regard to workers, although the larger labor 
stability does not improve significantly their labor earnings, it allows them to make more 
successful investments. Third, and completely unexpectedly from a theoretical point of view, 
having the investment stage increases social efficiency in the treatments (no dismissal barriers 
and permanent dismissal barriers) where opportunistic and myopic worker behavior had 
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otherwise prevailed. Having long-term investments helps to facilitate forward thinking and may 
encourage pro-social behavior. 
One caveat here is that contract renewal is based on effort levels in our design. However, 
in field settings the effort level is hardly observable and may differ from performance. Thus, 
relating dismissal barriers to performance will be easier, the higher the correlation between effort 
and performance, as with sports contracts.43 Another setting in which our contract may be 
applied is for jobs that involve repetitive and low-skill tasks. The experimental study of Eriksson 
et al. (2009) supports this conjecture, since they find a correlation between real-effort levels and 
performance of 0.87.44 A second point is that it may not be necessary to create the formal 
institution of renewable dismissal barriers, since firms could potentially institute this policy 
independently by communicating it to workers and finding a way to credibly commit to it.  But 
we do not take a position here on whether a formal institution is required or whether benefits can 
be obtained with incomplete contracts, as has been shown in many experimental environments. 
In sum, we see a strong link between behavior inside and outside the labor market.  The 
benefits and ramifications of improved employment stability seem to be well understood by 
workers, leading to better worker performance, a higher degree of social efficiency, and more 
long-term investment by workers. The latter seems quite valuable from a social perspective. 
Our results suggest that relating dismissal barriers to performance may well prove to have 
strong benefits, particularly when employment uncertainty may impede important long-term 
investment and performance.  Of course, while the intuition seems clear, this is only one study 
and so can only be a preliminary conclusion.  More research is needed on this important issue. 
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Table 4. Average effort levels, wages and profits 
 
Category NT1 PT1 RT1 NT2 PT2 RT2 
                                             All relationships 
Average desired effort level 7.82 
(0.25) 
8.22 
(0.18) 
8.52 
(0.20) 
6.65 
(0.29) 
7.00 
(0.53) 
8.08 
(0.38) 
Average effort level provided 5.34 
(0.36) 
5.41 
(0.31) 
6.61 
(0.38) 
3.39 
(0.33) 
3.59 
(0.50) 
5.66 
(0.57) 
Average wages 42.13 
(2.52) 
47.03 
(2.70) 
49.20 
(3.50) 
34.81 
(3.87) 
42.06 
(6.26) 
47.44 
(5.04) 
Average worker earnings 33.36 
(1.17) 
37.19 
(1.59) 
34.78 
(2.15) 
31.30 
(2.08) 
35.91 
(2.58) 
34.96 
(3.01) 
Average firm earnings 14.67 
(2.10) 
10.97 
(2.31) 
22.85 
(1.78) 
-0.06 
(2.55) 
-2.45 
(2.40) 
15.71 
(2.85) 
Average total earnings 48.72 
(3.13) 
49.56 
(2.98) 
60.59 
(3.08) 
30.85 
(3.27) 
34.60 
(4.50) 
53.48 
(5.14) 
 Long-Term relationships 
Average effort level 7.58 
(0.29) 
6.92 
(0.53) 
7.98 
(0.33) 
6.69 
(0.61) 
6.73 
(0.55) 
7.55 
(0.63) 
Average wages 50.01 
(2.76) 
56.01 
(2.33) 
53.62 
(3.58) 
52.86 
(5.11) 
57.90 
(4.94) 
52.77 
(5.25) 
Average worker earnings 38.81 
(1.84) 
45.14 
(1.78) 
40.06 
(2.42) 
41.64 
(4.63) 
49.11 
(4.94) 
44.21 
(4.28) 
Average firm earnings 25.36 
(2.34) 
13.17 
(4.31) 
27.78 
(2.15) 
14.18 
(5.54) 
10.63 
(3.47) 
24.58 
(4.05) 
Average total earnings 63.67 
(2.67) 
58.31 
(4.25) 
67.85 
(3.04) 
55.81 
(4.89) 
59.74 
(4.37) 
68.79 
(4.92) 
Percent of relationships 41% 41% 68% 9% 20% 55% 
 Short-Term relationships 
Average effort level  4.32 
(0.33) 
5.26 
(0.26) 
4.72 
(0.33) 
3.22 
(0.35) 
3.41 
(0.45) 
4.81 
(0.42) 
Average wages  36.51 
(2.64) 
41.59 
(2.48) 
37.76 
(2.71) 
33.82 
(3.70) 
40.69 
(6.05) 
40.50 
(3.93) 
Average worker earnings  31.07 
(1.25) 
33.65 
(1.40) 
28.17 
(1.61) 
29.95 
(3.27) 
34.30 
(5.30) 
29.58 
(3.25) 
Average firm earnings  6.43 
(1.58) 
10.44 
(1.93) 
9.25 
(2.21) 
-1.65 
(5.11) 
-6.00 
(2.55) 
7.02 
(1.59) 
Average total earnings  37.76 
(2.60) 
45.06 
(2.46) 
41.13 
(2.78) 
27.91 
(2.92) 
28.30 
(3.66) 
36.60 
(3.51) 
Note: Profits from the investment stage in the NT1,  PT1 and RT1 treatmens are never included in this Table. 
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Table 5. GMM Arellano-Bond on effort levels (by treatment) with investment stage 
Variable (1) NT1 (2) NT1 (3) RT1 (4) RT1 (5) PT1 (6) PT1 
Effort in t-1 0.151*** (0.011) 
0.200*** 
(0.018) 
0.033*** 
(0.013) 
0.095*** 
(0.023) 
-0.042*** 
(0.006) 
0.054*** 
(0.014) 
Effort in t-2 0.024*** (0.007) 
0.018 
(0.017) 
-0.016 
(0.010) 
-0.039** 
(0.015) 
0.049*** 
(0.011) 
0.027*** 
(0.008) 
Private 0.903*** (0.139) 
 1.112*** 
(0.192) 
 
 2.689*** 
(0.271) 
Protected  contract    
0.358*** 
(0.128) 
 
-0.587** 
(0.229) 
Wage 0.109*** (0.004)  
0.104*** 
(0.003) 
 
 
 
Desired effort  0.625*** (0.075) 
0.144*** 
(0.028) 
0.896*** 
(0.115) 
0.224*** 
(0.020) 
 
Cum. unemployment  -0.192*** (0.032) 
 
0.020 
(0.050) 
 
-0.110** 
(0.044) 
Cumulative profit  0.001*** (.0003) 
 .0005*** 
(.0002) 
.0008*** 
(0.0001) 
0.001*** 
(0.0002) 
Long-term project 0.998*** (0.148) 
0.694** 
(0.310) 
0.987*** 
(0.208) 
1.325*** 
(0.252) 
0.445*** 
(0.158) 
0.921*** 
(0.130) 
Same firm 2 periods  1.800*** (0.196) 
 3.421*** 
(0.279) 
2.678*** 
(0.081) 
 
Same firm 8 periods -0.787*** (0.089) 
-1.432*** 
(0.270) 
-0.230 
(0.170) 
1.035*** 
(0.325) 
-0.379*** 
(0.048) 
 
Period -0.013** (0.006) 
-0.067*** 
(0.012) 
-0.048*** 
(0.016) 
-0.202*** 
(0.030) 
-0.082*** 
(0.008) 
-0.089*** 
(0.008) 
Constant -0.571*** (0.098) 
-0.522 
(0.671) 
0.018 
(0.131) 
-1.303 
(0.909) 
3.623 
(0.217) 
4.144*** 
(0.171) 
Test AR(2) 0.292 0.348 0.367 0.636 0.492 0.798 
Hansen Test 0.290 0.528 0.475 0.392 0.740 0.216 
N 445 445 440 440 556 556 
Notes: Standard errors with the Windmeijer correction are in parentheses.***, **, and * indicate significance at p = 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, 
respectively, two-tailed tests.  Private is a dummy variable with is 1 if the effort is provided with a private offer andis 0 otherwise. Protected 
contract is a dummy variable that is 1 if the effort is provided when the worker was protected against dismissal andis 0 otherwise. 
Cumulative unemployment is the number of periods the worker has been unemployed.Cumulative profit is the cumulative profits obtained by 
the worker. Long-term projects is a dummy variable that is 1 if the worker has initiated an investment project andis 0 otherwise. Same firm 2 
periods is a dummy variable that is 1 if the worker has been hired by the same firm for 2 consecutive periods with a private offer.Same firm 8 
periods is a dummy variable that is 1 if the worker has been hired by the same firm for 8 consecutive periods. 
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Table 7: Probit Random Effects on the initiation of the long-term project (by treatment) 
 (1) NT (2) RT (3) RT (4) RT (5) PT (6) PT (7) PT 
Private 0.105** (0.045) 
0.101** 
(0.040)  
  0.060** (0.028) 
 
Protected contract   0.156*** (0.058) 
 0.315** 
(0.136) 
  
Cum. profit -0.0001 (0.0001) 
0.0001** 
(0.00005) 
0.0002** 
(0.0001) 
0.0002*** 
(0.0001) 
  0.0001* 
(0.00005) 
Cum. unemployment -0.025*** 
(0.008)   
-0.011** 
(0.004) 
-0.021*** 
(0.007) 
-0.014*** 
(0.005) 
-0.017*** 
(0.005) 
Cum. failed projects 0.113*** (0.024) 
0.159** 
(0.079) 
0.162** 
(0.010) 
0.178** 
(0.083) 
0.072*** 
(0.027) 
0.087*** 
(0.024) 
0.086*** 
(0.020) 
LL -103.491 -65.55 -52.290 -69.623 -63.482 -94.579 -96.437 
N 303 331 198 331 288 435 435 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at a worker level are in parentheses.***, **, and * indicate significance at p = 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively,         
two-tailed tests.  Private is a dummy variable with is 1 if the effort is provided with a private offer and 0 otherwise. Protected contract is a dummy 
variable with is 1 if the effort is provided when the worker was protected against dismissal and 0 otherwise. Cumulative unemployment is the number      
of periods the worker has been unemployed. Cumulative profit is the cumulative profits obtained by the worker. Cumulative failed projects is the         
number of previously-failed projects. 
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Appendix A 
 
Instructions for the Renewable-barriers treatment with investments (RT1)45 
1. In order to assure anonymity you have been randomly assigned a code (yellow card). At 
the beginning of the experiment you will receive an initial endowment of 5€. During the 
experiment, you can earn a higher amount of money by accumulating points. The amount 
of earned points will depend on your decisions and on the other participants’decisions.  
2. All points that you earn during the experiment will be exchanged into Euros at the end of 
the experiment. The exchange rate will be 45 points = 1€. At the end of the experiment 
you will be paid by cash and in private. 
3. There will be 17 participants, who will be divided into 2 groups: buyers and sellers. In 
this experiment there are 10 sellers and 7 buyers.  
4. You willeither be a buyer or a seller throughout the experiment. All participants have 
received an identification number, which they will keep throughout the experiment. 
5. The experiment consists of 18 periods. In each period, buyers and sellers have to make 
decisions. In the following, we describe in detail how you can make your decisions in 
each period. 
6. Phase 1: The Trading Phase. Each period starts with a trading phase. During the trading 
phase each buyer can reach a trading agreement with one seller. Buyers can submit 
several trading offers to sellers. As a seller you can accept one and only one of the offers 
submitted to you in each period. During the trading phase you will see the following 
screen (seller trading screen). 
a. The trading phase lasts 150 seconds. When this time elapses, the trading phase is 
over. Hereafter, no further offers can be submitted or accepted for this period.  
b. There are two types of offers: private and public offers. 
i. Private offers 
Each buyer has the opportunity to submit private offers to a specific seller. 
The selected seller will be informed about these offers and this seller alone 
can accept them. No other seller or buyer is informed of these offers. The 
offer of a buyer will contain the following information: the identification 
number of the buyer who submitted the offer, the price of the good, and the 
desired quality of the good. If the seller wants to accept a private offer, he 
must click on the button “accept offer”. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 For our experimental procedures we follow the instructions by Falk, Huffman and MacLeod (forthcoming). The 
instructions were slightly modified according to the treatment. 
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ii. Public offers 
Each buyer also can submit public offers. All sellers are informed of these 
offers and any seller can accept them. The offer of a buyer again contains 
the identification number of the buyer who submitted the offer, the price of 
the good and the desired quality. This information is also displayed to all 
sellers and all buyers. If a seller wants to accept a public offer he must 
follow the same procedures as with private offers (click on the button 
“accept offer”). 
c. Each seller can reach only one trading agreement in each period. Once a seller has 
accepted one offer he cannot accept any further offers. 
d. All buyers have to observe the following rules when submitting trading offers: 
The price offered by the buyer may not be lower than 0 or higher than 100: 
0 ≤ price ≤ 100 
The desired quality of the buyer may not be below 1 or higher than 10: 
1 ≤ desired quality ≤ 10 
e. As long as no offer has been accepted by a seller, the buyer can make as many 
public and private offers as he wishes. Each offer submitted by a buyer can be 
accepted at any time during the trading phase. 
f. Each buyer can reach only one trading agreement in each period. Once an offer of 
a buyer has been accepted he will be notified which seller accepted it. As each 
buyer can reach only one trading agreement in each period, all other offers for the 
buyer will be automatically cancelled.  
g. Once all 7 buyers have entered a trade agreement or after 150 seconds have 
elapsed, the trading phase is over. 
h. Buyers have no obligation to submit a trading offer, and sellers have no obligation 
to accept a trading offer. 
 
7. Phase 2: Determination of the Product Quality. Following the the trading phase, all 
sellers who have reached a trading agreement then determine which product quality they 
will supply to their corresponding buyers.  
a. The desired quality by the buyer is not binding for the seller. The seller can 
choose the exact quality desired by his/her buyer, but also a higher or lower 
product quality. 
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b. In order to choose the actual product quality, the seller must enter the value for 
the quality in the field “Determine the actual product quality” and press the “ok” 
button to confirm the choice. As long as the seller has not pressed “ok” he can 
alter his choice. 
c. The product quality that you choose must be an integer between 1 and 10. 
1 ≤ actual product quality ≤ 10 
8. The seller’s income: 
a. If a seller has not reached a trading agreement during a trading phase he earns an 
income of 5 points for that period. 
b. If a seller has accepted a trading offer, his income depends on the price he 
accepted and the product quality he chose to deliver. His income will be 
calculated as follows: 
Seller’s income = Price - production costs 
c. The higher the quality of the good, the higher the production costs are. The 
production costs for each product quality are displayed in the table below: 
Quality 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
10 
 
Production  
Costs 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 
 
18 
 
 
d. The seller’s income is therefore higher, the lower the quality. Furthermore, his 
income is higher, the higher the price offered by the buyer is. 
9. The buyer’s income: 
a. If a buyer does not reach a trading agreement during a trading phase he earns an 
income of 0 points for that period. 
b. If one of his trading offers is accepted, his income depends on the price he offered 
and on the quality supplied to him. The income of your buyer will be determined 
as follows: 
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Buyer’s income = 10 * product quality - price 
c. Therefore the higher the quality, the higher the buyer’s income. At the same time 
his income is higher, the lower the price is. 
10. The income of all buyers and sellers are determined in the same way. Each buyer can 
therefore calculate the income of his seller and each seller can calculate the income of his 
buyer. 
11. Please note that buyers and sellers can incur losses in each period. These losses would 
have to be paid from your initial endowment or from earnings in other periods. 
12. You will be informed of your income and the income of your buyer/seller on an “income 
screen”. On the screen (see below) the following will be displayed.The buyer or seller 
with whom you traded, the price the selller offered, the desired quality by the buyer, the 
product quality supplied by the seller, and the income for the buyerand the seller in this 
period. 
13. Please enter all the information in the documentation sheet supplied to you. After the 
income screen has been displayed, the respective period is concluded. Thereafter the 
trading phase of the following period starts. Once you have finished studying the income 
screen please click on the “next” button. 
14. Additional rule: “Right to get an offer” There is one more rule to consider. If in a 
private offer a seller delivers a quality level at least as high as that desired by the buyer, 
then the seller enjoys the “right to get an offer” in the next period. That is, the buyer is 
obligated to offer a private contract to this seller in the next period. 
a. If the previous condition happens in a public offer, the right to get an offer is not 
established.  
b. The “right to get an offer” means that in the next period the buyer must make the 
seller an offer that is available as soon as soon as the trading phase begins. This 
offer consists of a price and a desired quality. The price must be at least as high as 
the one in the previous period. 
c. In addition to this offer, the seller with this “right” will also see the other public 
and private offers, which have been offered to him and the other sellers. This 
seller can accept the offer of “his” buyer or any other offer that has been made 
(private or public) by other buyers. 
d. As long as this seller has not decided which offer to select, “his” buyer cannot 
make another offer to this or another seller. This means that this seller can accept 
the offer of “his” buyer as long as the seller has not declined it (and trading time 
has not elapsed).  
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e. The buyer will be informed about the seller’s decision. If the seller accepts 
another buyer’s offer, “his” buyer is free to make offers to other sellers. As long 
as the seller has not decided, all “his” buyer can do is waiting and observing the 
market. 
f. If the seller accepts the offer of “his” buyer and the seller again delivers a quality 
of the product at least as buyer’s desired quality, then the buyer is again 
compelled to offer another private contract to this seller in the next period.  If and 
only if the seller does not satisfy the quality of the product requested by the buyer 
or the seller accepts the offer of another buyer does the right to receive an offer 
expire. This means that the right to receive an offer can only be terminated by the 
seller. 
g. An example concerning the right to receive an offer.Assume that buyer 4 and 
seller 7 have reached an agreement in period 2, based on a private offer, and seller 
7 has provided higher quality than was requested by the buyer. From period 3 on, 
seller 7 then enjoys the right to receive an offer. This means that buyer 4 has to 
make seller 7 an offer in the third period before the trading period begins. If seller 
7 accepts and he again satisfies the desired quality by the buyer, then in period 
fourth, seller 7 again enjoys the right to receive an offer. That is, whenever a 
seller satisfies at least the desired quality requested by the buyer, the seller will 
enoy the right to get an offer in the next period. 
15. Phase 3: The investment phase: This phase is only for sellers. Buyers do not have this 
investment phase. Buyers are aware of the investment stage for sellers but they do not 
know whether a seller has undertook an investment project or not. The conditions to 
undertake an investment project are the following ones: 
a. The seller may decide whether to initiate a project in any period prior to period 
12. After period 12, it is no longer possible to initiate an investment project . 
b. The seller must have reached a trade agreement with a minimum profit of 10 
points in the same period in which he decides to initiate an investment project . 
c. The cost of the project is 10 points per period invested. Therefore, the seller must 
reach trade agreements with a minimum profit of 10 points in every period he is 
investing. Otherwise, the project ends. The project also automatically ends the 
first period in which the seller does not reach a trading agreement. 
d. If a seller decides to initiate a project, it should last at least eight consecutive 
periods in order to get  positive profits. 
e. If the project lasts at least eight consecutive periods, net profits will be: 
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Project costs = 10 * number of periods investing 
Project returns = 15 * number of periods investing 
Net profit of the project = 5 * number of periods investing 
f. That is, the more consecutive periods (8 or more) that the project lasts, the higher 
the net profit from the investment project. For example, if a seller initiates a 
project in period 5 and this ends in period 15, this would mean a net profit of 55 
points (5 net points for each of the 11 periods that the project is active). 
g. If the project lasts less than 8 periods , net profitswill be: 
Project costs = 10 * number of periods investing 
Project returns = 0 
Net profit of the project = -10 * number of periods investing 
h. That is, if the project lasts less than 8 consecutive periods, it will imply losses to 
the seller. For example, if a seller initiates a project in period 5 and this ends in 
period 10, it will mean a net loss of 60 points (10 points for each of the six 
periods that the project is active). 
16. The experiment will not start until all participants are completely familiar with all the 
procedures. In order to be sure that this is the case, we kindly ask you to solve the 
exercises below. 
17. Before starting the experiment, buyers and sellers will participate in two practice periods. 
These trial periods will not be added to the result of theexperiment and therefore will not 
be remunerated. 
 
Questionnaire 
Just to be sure that you understand the instructions you have to solve a very simple test. 
When everyone in the room has answered correctly the test, we will start the experiment. 
 
Question1: A seller accepts an offer of a buyer with both a price of 60 and a desired 
quality of 9. The seller chooses to provide a quality of 9. Please, fill in the answers: 
Seller’s income = ____      Buyer’s income = ____ 
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Question 2:A seller accepts an offer of a buyer with both a price of 50 and a desired 
quality of 8. The seller chooses to provide a quality of 4. Please, fill in the answers. 
Seller’s income = ____       Buyer’s income = ____ 
 
Question 3:Suppose a seller has accepted a public offer of a buyer in period 5. The buyer 
desires a quality of 8 and the seller delivers a quality of 9. a) Will the seller enjoy the 
right to get an offer in period 6?And if the offer was private, will the seller enjoy the right 
to get an offer in period 6? Please, circle the right answer. 
 a) Yes   No 
 b) Yes   No 
 
Question 4: Suppose a seller has decided to invest in a project in period 7 and she reaches 
trading agreements from period 7 to period 13 with a minimum profit of 10 points in each 
period. However, in period 14, she does not get any trading agreement.  What is the profit 
of the investment? Please, fill in the answers: 
Project costs = ______ 
Project returns = ______ 
Net profit of the project  = ______ 
Question 5: Suppose a seller has decided to invest in a project in period 9 and she reaches 
trading agreements from period 9 to period 17 with a minimum profit of 10 points in each 
period. However, in period 18, she does not get any trading agreement.  What is the profit 
of the investment? Please, fill in the answers: 
Project costs = ______ 
Project returns = ______ 
Net profit of the project  = ______ 
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Appendix B 
Figure B: Percentage of Workers initiating an investment over time 
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